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16 July 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: SATURN; West and East Germany

1. **PURPOSE:** The purpose of CIA support to this GIB operation is to assist the GIB in the development of assets to satisfy the JCS UN and FI Staybehind requirements and thereby establish CIA/US access to and equity in those assets in the event of a Hot War.

2. **BACKGROUND:** When CIA assumed responsibility for the GIB in 1949 the GIB had already initiated a Staybehind program under COMINT auspices. From 1949 until 1957 CIA fully subsidized the SATURN program which was continued and expanded under CIA direction. In the absence of specific requirements from U.S. war planning agencies suitable for passing to the GIB, the SATURN program has been implemented using combined GIB/CIA estimates of strategic targets. With the acceptance by CIA of the JCS UN requirements in late 1956, CIA will now attempt to guide future development of SATURN in accordance with these requirements.

3. **OBJECTIVES:**

a. To support and maintain GIB acceptance of a war preparatory responsibility.

b. To maintain CIA guidance over the following GIB war preparatory activities:

- (1) FI Staybehind, West and East Germany (STURCH)
- (2) Air and Maritime reception teams for resupply (FOX) and personnel infiltration, West Germany
- (3) Caches to support the FI and A/M assets, West Germany (WHEEL)

c. To assure, in so far as is possible, CIA's equity in the GIB Staybehind activities in the event of a Hot War.

4. **TASKS:**

a. For CIA:

- (1) To support the training of SATURN agents through the provision of training materials and equipment not available to the GIB from their own sources (e.g., aircraft for drop exercises, BE beacons), to make possible a realistic training program.
- (2) To ensure that data on staybehind assets, both personnel and material, is kept current and complete in a safe repository in the U.S.

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by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

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- (3) To be present and assist at SATURN training exercises.
- (4) To provide guidance on Staybehind doctrine and techniques
- (5) To provide logistic support for the program.

b. For GIB: Under the supervision of the GIB staybehind staff, the Operations Chief will be responsible for the performance of the following tasks during peacetime:

- (1) To recruit and train teams for the collection and communication of positive intelligence in a Hot War situation. The number and location of these teams should be in accordance with the JCS FI Hot War requirements which have not yet been completed. The GIB has proceeded with this portion of the SATURN program on the basis of their own targeting which divided West Germany into about 75 areas in each of which they planned to recruit an agent and a W/T operator. This plan has proved to be over-ambitious and unrealistic for a nuclear warfare situation, and the GIB has attained less than 50% of their original goal. It is expected that the JCS requirements will not demand a program of such large scope.
- (2) To recruit and train teams for the reception of resupply items and personnel by air and sea. The present goal is ~~in~~ complete teams at least one of which will be maritime and the remainder aerial.
- (3) To select and document ~~the~~ Drop Zones.
- (4) To establish and document ~~the~~ caches for the support of the FI Staybehind and A/M reception teams.

5. PERSONNEL:

a. Key GIB Staff Personnel (See Madelwald Project para 5 A)

b. Staybehind Assets:

(1) FI West Germany (STORCH)

Ready Teams (W/T operator and agent)	16
Ready W/T Singletons	12
Teams with W/t operator ready and agent in training	6
Ready W/T operators for team use (agent still to be recruited)	6
Ready agents (W/T operator still to be recruited)	4
Teams, fully staffed (W/T operator and agent in training)	9
Other recruited personnel in training:	
W/T operators for eventual team assignment	2
W/T operators for singleton use	4
Agents for eventual team assignment	22

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(2) FI, Berlin and East Germany (AFUs)

	Ready W/T Agents		
	2 Man Teams	Singletons	In Training (Singletons only)
W. Berlin	2	3	0
E. Berlin	1	2	1
E. Germany	0	2	1
TOTALS	3	7	2

(3) Air/Maritime Reception Teams, West Germany (FUK)

Total Teams with at least W/T operator and Agent Ready 7

Of the above there are:

(a) Teams with W/T, Agent and two assistants	2
(b) Teams with W/T, Agent and one assistant	2
(c) Teams with W/T and Agent only	3

6. COVER:

a. For status: The GIB has established a German corporation which serves as cover for the headquarters activity of the program as well as for the branch offices utilized by the spotters, recruiters, etc.

b. For action: Individual agents develop the cover for action on an individual need basis, living under natural cover within the local economic structure of the area which they are servicing and in which they are residing.

7. CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS:

a. Administrative: Contact and communication is maintained through the normal facilities available to FOB and the GIB.

b. Operational: In case of Hot War, communication will be by W/T from the team operator to a wartime base.

Details of UFGWING's current methods of communication with field agents are not known but are presumably based on normal facilities, i.e., telephone and telegraph and mail.

8. EVALUATION: In evaluating the SATURN program it is essential to recognize that it has been CIA policy to rely almost exclusively on UFGWING for war-preparatory operations to fulfill requirements placed on CIA. CIA's current unilateral Staybehind assets are therefore negligible. With renewed emphasis on CIA's role in this field dictated by the RMD for Germany it is hoped that this situation will change but it would be unrealistic to anticipate a CIA capability to fulfill the JCS requirements unilaterally in the foreseeable future. We will therefore continue to be dependent on the willingness and

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ability of the GIB to optimize the SATURN program. Our continued equity in the GIB SATURN assets depends largely on the continuation of CIA support both in Germany and through the provision of the Spanish Base. In addition to the personnel recruited as detailed in paragraph 5 above, the following caches have been established by the GIB:

W/T caches	26
Cipher material	46
Generators	4
Operational aids	55
Barter material	37
Food	11
Empty containers for emergency caching	4

9. FUTURE PLANNING AND PROBLEMS: The recent developments will have considerable effect on the SATURN program. The acceptance by CIA of the JCS WJ requirements will necessitate a review of current assets against these requirements and a realignment of operational plans to fill any gaps. In addition the GIB has been a participating member of the clandestine Planning Committee, a British, French, U.S. planning committee which acts as a link between SHAPE and the national intelligence services of NATO nations, since February 1957. GIB participation will mean that they will receive requirements from SHAPE through a channel other than CIA. CIA however will attempt to retain its position as "favored broker."

Although the STURGE, FOK and WIESEL portions of SATURN have made more than adequate progress, the East German AFU (FI W/T operator) recruitment has not. Although the GIB plans to increase their effort in this field, experience has shown that no great expansion should be expected because of the difficulty in finding suitable East German personnel. Essential to the wartime exploitation of these assets is a communications base. CIA and the GIB are in the process of preparing specifications and a detailed proposal for the construction of this facility in Spain.

Part II

ESTIMATED EXPENSES: Total estimated expenses for the period covered by this project are \$5,000. All expenses incurred in this activity are for training of GIB Staybehind assets.

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